Special Standing Committee

Mrs. Marion Roe in the Chair]

Adoption and Children Bill

Marion Roe: I should inform the Committee that the Programming Sub-Committee met just before this sitting and agreed a resolution, a copy of which has been circulated in the Room. The Committee must consider that resolution before proceeding with further consideration of the Bill.
 Resolved, 
If two days are allotted for consideration and Third Reading of the Adoption and Children Bill, the Special Standing Committee recommends that proceedings on consideration be brought to a conclusion two hours before the time at which proceedings on Third Reading are to be brought to a conclusion.—[Jacqui Smith.]
 Clauses 100 to 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 121 - Orders made in the Channel Islands

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: Lest we should finish at 3 o'clock, I should be grateful if the Minister would further explain the clause. This part of the Bill clearly amends existing relevant legislation. The clause refers to the Police Act 1997 and criminal records. I am curious as to what constitutes a criminal record as regards breaches of adoption procedure, given that we have debated class 5 offences contained in the Bill. This is an opportunity for the Minister to supply a few details, in case there is anything that we want to question.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Gentleman is right. Clause 121 deals with criminal records in relation to adoption and fostering and, in particular, is designed to ensure that the needs and welfare of children are safeguarded. The new Criminal Records Bureau is being established under the Police Act 1997 to provide—among other things—for a system for vetting those who work with children, and a one-stop shop will simplify and speed up that process.
 The intention is that criminal record checks and enhanced criminal record checks should be available through the bureau on both prospective foster and adoptive parents and other adults in the same household as them. Such checks for the purpose of determining the suitability of persons to act as foster parents and adoptive parents are already specifically provided for under sections 113 and 115 of the Police Act 1997. 
 Criminal record certificates under section 113 cover both spent and unspent convictions and cautions, reprimands and warnings. Enhanced criminal record certificates under section 115 also include ''soft'' 
 information from local police records that the chief officer of police considers relevant. That would include relevant matters that did not lead to a conviction. The process for both types of certificate would also include a check of lists maintained by the Department of Health and the Department for Education and Skills of persons considered unsuitable to work with children, under the one-stop shop arrangement provided for by the Protection of Children Act 1999. 
 I hope that with that clarification, the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) will feel able to support clause 121. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 121 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 124 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 3 agreed to.

Schedule 4 - Transitional provisions and savings

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move amendment No. 268, in page 96, line 22, leave out from beginning to 'not' and insert—
'Paragraph 36 of Schedule 3 does'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 269 and 270.

Jacqui Smith: We come to schedule 4, which is, as I would have said of schedule 3 if I had had a chance, a technical measure that does not give rise to any new policy areas. I should apologise for the Government amendments, which correct errors in references to paragraph numbers in the schedule in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15. I hope that hon. Members will feel able to accept the amendments.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 269, in page 96, line 29, leave out '75' and insert '72'. 
 No. 270, in page 96, line 33, leave out '79' and insert '76'. 
 Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to. 
 Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 125 - Orders, rules and regulations

Robert Walter: I beg to move amendment No. 274, in page 70, line 4, leave out subsection 4.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 272, in page 70, line 4, leave out
'an Order in Council or to'.
 No. 273, in line 4, leave out from 'Council' to the end of line 5.

Robert Walter: One might describe these as probing amendments, as part of my pursuit of joined-up government in these islands. The amendments come out of one part of my experience as a shadow Minister, dealing with one part of the kingdom, Wales. These Orders in Council—statutory instruments—can be
 passed in Westminster, or in the Scottish Parliament or the National Assembly for Wales. The Bill goes on to lay down procedures for the annulment of those instruments, although not an Order in Council or subordinate legislation made by Scottish Ministers or the Assembly. I worry that we could end up with a series of practices and procedures in adoption law under legislation in Scotland, Wales and England, and that people will not necessarily all be singing from the same hymn sheet when the law is implemented.
 I tabled three amendments in order to give the Government the opportunity to accept one or another. I am particularly concerned that it is possible for the House to annul an Order in Council under subsection (2)—it is specific about that—but there is no provision for the annulment of secondary legislation enacted in either the Scottish Parliament or the National Assembly for Wales. That seems to be an omission from the legislation. It would probably be far better if we did not include in this legislation provisions for annulment in this place, if there is no provision for annulment in either the Scottish Parliament or the National Assembly for Wales. It seems that the legislation is deficient, if only technically. I should be interested to hear the Minister's explanation for the exceptions that are made in subsection (4). If those exceptions are to persist, how will the Scottish Parliament or the National Assembly for Wales go about annulling a statutory instrument that they have made under this legislation?

Jacqui Smith: I am not sure whether the intention behind the amendments is to probe, to raise specific technical points or—dare I suggest—to engage in a little debate about the principles of devolution. I am sure that it is not the latter, because that would, of course, be inappropriate, so I shall address the amendments.
 Clause 125(1) provides that any power in the Bill that enables orders, rules or regulations to be made by the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers, the National Assembly for Wales or the Registrar General is to be exercised by making a statutory instrument. 
 Subsections (2) and (3) provide for parliamentary procedure. The statutory instruments made under clause 88(6) amending the list of prohibited steps in relation to adoption, those made under clause 90, which covers restrictions on reports, and those made under clause 113(6) amending the restrictions on advertising in relation to adoption in the light of developments in technology, and any instruments that amend the primary legislation are to be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. 
 Subsection (4) makes it clear that the parliamentary procedures in Westminster do no apply to an Order in Council or to subordinate legislation by Scottish Ministers or by the National Assembly for Wales. 
 Subordinate legislation made under the Bill might make different provision for different purposes. It may also make provision in respect of particular cases or classes of case. The amendments would mean that the 
 provisions in subsections (2) and (3) did not apply to an Order in Council or to subordinate legislation made by Scottish Ministers or by the National Assembly for Wales. 
 The intention behind amendments Nos. 273 and 274 seems to be to make Orders in Council made under the Bill subject to the negative resolution procedure. In fact, the only power in the Bill to make an Order in Council is in clause 123. The Committee will remember that that is an enabling power, which enables an Order in Council to give effect to the convention on protection of children and co-operation in respect of inter-country adoption in a British overseas territory. It is not subject to parliamentary procedure. It is a legislative mechanism to enable the British overseas territories to give effect to the convention, should they wish to do so. Giving effect to the convention in the British overseas territories is essentially a matter for those territories. It should not be subject to Westminster parliamentary procedure. Of course, the Order in Council would be laid before the House, so that Parliament was aware of it. I can reassure the hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter) that that would by no means be unique to the Bill. When an Order in Council is necessary in relation to such a territory, the matter is handled in that way. 
 Amendment No. 272 omits from subsection (4) the reference to subordinate legislation made under the Bill by Scottish Ministers and the National Assembly for Wales. That would have the effect that such legislation would be subject to Westminster parliamentary procedures as they are applied by subsections (2) and (3). In many ways, if not explicitly, the amendment attempts to undermine the devolution settlement. Because of that settlement, Scottish Ministers and the Assembly should be subject to the procedures of the Scottish Parliament and the Assembly when exercising powers. Both bodies have procedures to consider secondary legislation. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman is reassured that although the scrutiny process may not be carried out by the Westminster Parliament, it will rightly be carried out by the legislatures that have responsibility in those cases. 
 The existing Scottish powers to make subordinate legislation are set out in the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978. Scottish Ministers want to continue to use those procedures in relation to subordinate legislation made under the Bill, rather than to use the procedures in the Bill. It is for Scottish Ministers to decide on procedures for making subordinate legislation in Scotland, not for Westminster. 
 It is a fundamental principle of the devolution settlement that subordinate legislation made solely by the National Assembly for Wales should be handled in accordance with its own procedures. The amendment runs contrary to the spirit of devolution by rendering secondary legislation in Wales under the Bill subject to parliamentary procedures and removing the decision-making process from the National Assembly. 
 The hon. Gentleman expressed concern about the extent to which there would be coherence about adoption procedures across the United Kingdom. At various points during our proceedings, we have discussed how the Bill will provide consistency for those involved in adoption. That is the important point, not that there be one uniform way to determine the secondary legislation under the Bill. 
 For the reasons that I have outlined, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that the amendment is inappropriate and withdraw it.

Robert Walter: I thank the Minister for her explanations, especially about Orders in Council. She rightly pointed out that they relate only to clause 123.
 I think that I was right to table the amendments, because I am concerned about consistency of practice in adoption law across the UK. I do not want to reopen the devolution debate, and I do not think that the Committee is the appropriate place in which to do so. However, I am concerned that when we pass legislation on adoption, the writ of this Parliament should run throughout the United Kingdom on a consistent basis, even though the ability to pass secondary legislation in Scotland and Wales is in the Bill. I wished simply to probe the Government on the issue of consistency by raising those points. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 125 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 126 - Rules of procedure

Tim Loughton: I beg to move amendment No. 11, in page 70, line 21, at end insert—
'( ) In the case of an application for a placement order, for the variation or revocation of such an order, or for an adoption order, the rules must require that the court or adoption agency make available to the legal representatives of the parent or guardian of any child subject to such an application all records used by the court or adoption agency in relation to that proceeding.'.
 The amendment stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner), who has shown an extra-mural interest in the Committee by tabling amendments and a new clause of great merit. This is a probing amendment that seeks to establish balance and fairness in the legal processes connected with adoption. The amendment would add a condition to the procedure for the conduct of court cases. 
 The point of the amendment is to make it clear that all the information that is made available to the court should be made available to the legal representatives of the child's natural parents, even if such information is not, for whatever reasons decided by the court, made available to the parents. That is self-explanatory. This is an important stage in the adoption process, at which the parent or guardian may be on the verge of relinquishing control of or responsibility for the child. It is even more important than usual that every party to those proceedings should feel that they have had a full and fair opportunity to make their case, and that all the relevant information has been available to them, hence the amendment's stipulation 
 that those documents should be made available, at the very least, to the legal representatives of the parent or guardian. 
 I said that this was a probing amendment. It may be that what it deals with is already catered for elsewhere in the Bill, but it seems to me to make a sensible addition to the procedures that the Bill introduces.

Jacqui Smith: I understand the intentions behind the amendment. I hope that I will be able to provide the assurances that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham needs, and that he will convey my assurances to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight.
 Birth parents are parties to applications for an adoption order. They will be notified that an application for such an order has been lodged with the court, and should have the papers, in accordance with the rules. Where an application to dispense with parental consent to adoption has been made, the statement of facts on which the applicants intend to rely is prepared by the adoption agency and will also be sent to the birth parents. 
 The schedule 2 reports prepared by the agency in agency cases and by the local authority in non-agency cases, in accordance with adoption rules, are confidential. However, the courts have a discretion to allow birth parents or their legal representatives to see any part of a schedule 2 report prepared by the adoption agency, or Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service reports that refer to that individual, when the circumstances of the individual case make it appropriate. 
 Birth parents, or any other party to the proceedings, may apply to the court for the disclosure of other information. In such circumstances, the court will decide whether information in the reports needs to be anonymised—I am sorry; I should have said made anonymous—before disclosure to ensure confidentiality. In doing so, it will always take into account the best interests of the child. 
 This amendment would require court rules to provide for the records used by courts or adoption agencies in adoption and placement proceedings to be sent to the legal representatives of the birth parents. ''Records'' is a wide term, and could include the records kept by the adoption agency in connection with the child, the birth parents and the prospective adopters. In determining whether to disclose information, it is necessary for the court to strike a balance between the interests and rights of the birth parents, and the interests and rights of the adopters and the child. Releasing that information automatically may pose a serious threat to the child's placement with the adopters. It may also discourage more adopters from coming forward to adopt, due to concerns about their rights to privacy. 
 The practice of disclosing documents to legal representatives only is seen by many solicitors and barristers as unacceptable. It places the lawyers in a difficult position to have information that they may not show their clients. Many lawyers believe that it is 
 incompatible with their professional duties and will not accept it. 
 The Government intend to make rules under clause 126 to govern the disclosure of information in placement and adoption proceedings. Those rules will be similar to the current rules but will reflect the differences in the Bill, which we have already debated, and will be consulted on before they are made. 
 In the light of those assurances and my explanation of why it would be inappropriate to have blanket disclosure in such cases, I hope that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Tim Loughton: I am grateful to the Minister. I said that it was a probing amendment. I shall convey what the Minister has said to my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight, although I am sure that he will be keen to log on to the internet as soon as he can, if he does not wait for Hansard, to read what has been said about his amendment.
 The Minister made some useful points. The courts have discretion to show the reports when appropriate, although in some cases they should not be released automatically. There are obvious practical difficulties. As she said, lawyers do not wish to receive information that they cannot pass on to their clients. Other than the quite outrageous re-use of the word ''anonymised''—the Minister duly apologised for using it—it was a highly satisfactory response to the amendment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Sandra Gidley: I beg to move amendment No. 243, in page 70, line 24, after '(4)', insert 'and the child'.
 This is yet another probing amendment. I wish to highlight the voice of the child. I seek clarification on how the rules of procedure can ensure the full and proper representation of children in placement and adoption proceedings. I admit to a certain surprise that the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) did not pre-empt me on this, because he and outside agencies have often raised concerns about the voice of the child in the Bill. 
 Despite the declared aim to put the child at the centre of the Bill, this legislation does not ensure that the abuse of children is given the fullest possible weight. That is especially important given that adoption is an irrevocable process. Clause 1(4)(a) provides that the court or the adoption agency must have regard to a child's ascertainable wishes and feelings. It is right that they should be considered—according to the child's age and understanding—but, despite the intention, it is disappointing that the child's voice is not given more prominence. It is essential that children's wishes and feelings are given the fullest possible weight, bearing in mind the previously mentioned parameters. The Bill should, therefore, set out a clear mechanism to ensure that their views are fully and properly represented to the court in all cases. 
 That should happen independently of the adoption agency, the applicants and the birth parents, if that proves necessary. 
 Article 6 of the European convention on human rights and article 12 of the UN convention on the rights of the child are relevant to the rights and representation of children. Article 12 states: 
''State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child . . . For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.''
 The explanatory notes state that 
''the child shall automatically be a party to proceedings in placement order cases, and shall be able to apply to the court for leave to be made a party to adoption proceedings.''
 Many people believe that consultation on the rules is necessary at the earliest opportunity, and it would be helpful if the Minister could give a little more detail about their proposed content, the timetable for consultation and—this is probably beyond hope—whether the timetable will allow for consideration of the rules during the passage of the Bill. 
 Adoption should proceed on the basis of the adoption agency and the court making sufficient and thorough investigations. It is also important that a children's guardian is appointed to investigate the child's welfare in every adoption case, with an independent check being made of social work practice. If there were a problem with the proposed adoption in the child's view, the children's guardian would alert the court, as appropriate. Every child would have an independent voice through their guardian, but older children could also have an input into the proceedings. 
 I apologise that I could not be here to move an earlier amendment, but I had a commitment that I could not get out of.

Henry Bellingham: Don't worry.

Sandra Gidley: I am sure that hon. Members were delighted.
 The Bill could be amended to require that placement proceedings were closely linked to care proceedings and that adoption proceedings were specified proceedings under section 41 of the Children Act 1989. In specified proceedings, the courts appoint a CAFCASS officer for the child, unless they are satisfied that that it is not necessary to safeguard the child's interests. Such a provision would ensure that the child's wishes and feelings were reported to the court independently, rather than by the adoption agency, the birth family or the applicants. That would ensure proper investigation and a clear presentation of the child's views and welfare.

Jacqui Smith: Clause 126 enables the Lord Chancellor to make rules on matters of adoption
 procedure. The amendment would require those rules to provide that the child be notified of the date and place of a hearing in relation to an application for a placement order, the variation or revocation of a placement order and an adoption order. It would also require the rules to provide that the child need not attend the hearing, unless he wished to do so or the court required it.
 The Government do not think that it would be appropriate for the rules to make provision along those lines. In many cases, the child will be too young to understand the meaning of an application for a placement order or an adoption order, let alone the significance of the court hearing. In addition, we will need to ensure that children are not unnecessarily made party to proceedings, because involvement in them can be stressful for children, and it may be in some children's best interests to have their views represented differently. 
 I understand the points made by the hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) and the concerns about how we ensure that the child's interests and voice are best represented in the system. We shall automatically make children a party to proceedings in placement order cases—as they currently are in care order cases—and we shall appoint a children's guardian. That will give children the right to separate legal representation. 
 The Bill does not provide for a child to be a party to all adoption proceedings, as we discussed earlier in the Committee. That is because such a provision may not be necessary in cases such as step-parent or relative adoptions. Court rules will, however, provide for the appointment of a CAFCASS officer in any adoption proceedings. The Government currently intend the child to be able to apply to the court for leave to be made a party to adoption proceedings, and the application will be considered in the light of the child's age and understanding. 
 In addition, the Lord Chancellor's Department and CAFCASS will use the opportunity provided by the creation of CAFCASS to consider the representation of children in all private law proceedings. They will consider whether other types of case might require children to be made a party to the proceedings or to be automatically appointed a children's guardian. They will also examine changes to the criteria used by the courts in considering whether to grant leave for a child to be made a party to proceedings. Any rule changes suggested in that review will be subject to consultation. 
 As regards the timetable for consultation on the draft rules, we must finalise the Bill and take into account the views of Parliament before we complete those rules. We intend to start consultation on their contents as soon as practicable thereafter, which we hope will be before the end of the year. We also hope that that will allow for a full three-month consultation period. 
 On a more general note, children of sufficient age and understanding are often invited to meet the judge, for example, to celebrate the making of an adoption order in straightforward cases. That ensures that they see the making of the order as a special occasion, and 
 they are often given cards to mark the significance of the day. In that regard, it should be said that judges are often careful not to invite the child to court until it is clear that the adoption order will be made, to avoid disappointing them. For some children—particularly younger ones—becoming involved in court proceedings can be a daunting prospect, and we must ensure that the system retains the flexibility to meet children's particular needs. The arrangements that I described are important because they allow the court to convey the significance of adoption, and I am sure that many of us would be excited to meet a judge. 
 It is important that the Bill ensures that the child's views are taken into account in all the decisions that courts and adoption agencies make about adoption. As we discussed, clause 1(4)(a) will oblige the courts, when making such decisions, to ascertain and take account of the child's views, bearing in mind his age and understanding. Furthermore, the Government have made it clear that the child's wishes and feelings should be actively sought and fully taken into account at all stages of the adoption process. That key value underpins our national adoption standards. 
 Court rules made under clauses 97 and 126 will provide for the appointment and duties of a CAFCASS officer. Those may include acting on behalf of a child in partnership with a legal adviser or reporting to the court on the child's wishes and feelings. Clause 1(4)(a) will oblige the courts to consider those views in reaching any decision. I hope that on the basis of those reassurances, the hon. Lady will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Sandra Gidley: I thank the Minister for that clarification. Such a detailed response is helpful, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 126 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 127 - Supplementary and consequential provision

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move amendment No. 262, in page 71, line 24, at end insert—
'( ) The power of the Registrar General to make regulations under Chapter 5 of Part 1 may, with the approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, be exercised so as to make— 
 (a) any supplementary, incidental or consequential provision, 
 (b) any transitory, transitional or saving provision, 
 which the Registrar General considers necessary or expedient'.
 Clause 127 deals with supplementary and consequential provision. Subsection (1) will enable the appropriate Minister to make such supplementary, incidental, consequential, transitional or saving provisions as he considers necessary to give full effect to the Bill. The amendment will insert a new subsection into the clause. Subsection (2) provides that any power of the Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State or Assembly may be exercised to make those supplementary, incidental, consequential, transitional or saving provisions, if necessary or expedient. 
 The amendment will extend that provision to give the Registrar-General identical supplementary powers to those of the Secretary of State when exercising any 
 of his chapter 5 powers, with the approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If those powers are not provided for the Registrar-General, he will not be able to make incidental, transitional or saving provisions when new regulations are made or existing ones amended. To do that, he will need a power that may be exercised only with the approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and only if provision is necessary or expedient. One example is a provision in respect of the use or acceptance of a form by the Registrar-General's office before a certain date, such as the date when new regulations come into force. 
 I hope that hon. Members will accept that the amendment extends to the Registrar-General powers similar to those that exist for others who are responsible for making regulations, and that, on that basis, they will support it. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 127, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 128 - Offences by bodies corporate and

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Julian Brazier: I want to ask the Minister how the clause will be enforced. We could have asked the same question about clause 14, but that has been and gone. The clause's purpose is self-explanatory, and I am sure that the Committee will approve of it. If there is no independent body for people to complain to, how will offences be identified? Or does the clause relate only to those rare cases in which a criminal trial or formal inquiry has taken place?

Jacqui Smith: I hope to come to enforcement in a moment. Clause 128 makes provision on offences by bodies corporate or unincorporated bodies. Where an offence is committed by a body corporate—as we discussed previously, a body corporate has a legal existence separate from those people who make it up—and when the offence has also been proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or due to the neglect of, an office of a body corporate or an unincorporated body, that officer, as well as the body, is guilty of the offence. In other words, it ensures that we are dealing not only with offences committed by legal entities, but that we can ensure that the officers of incorporated bodies are made liable. In cases when the affairs of a body corporate are managed by its members rather than by officers, the provisions apply equally to members and officers.
 As with the other offences that we have considered, enforcement might happen in a variety of ways. Offences may be identified by the National Care Standards Commission, as part of its inspection process—for example, offences committed by adoption support agencies. Other offences may be 
 reported to the police, or the police may be prompted by complaints to make an investigation.

Julian Brazier: Is it therefore possible for members of the public to ask the National Care Standards Commission to investigate complaints?

Jacqui Smith: I think that individual members of the public will be able to go to the National Care Standards Commission. My previous comments were about the fact that the commission, when carrying out its regulatory and inspection function, might find that offences had been committed of the sort that we have been discussing. However, individuals might also have the ability to complain. It might be best if I clarify that point by writing to the hon. Gentleman.

Julian Brazier: I think that if I intervene, a brief might be made ready for the Minister. I do not mean that facetiously; the Minister may be able to give at least a partial response in a moment if you, Mrs. Roe, will let me make a slightly longer intervention than usual. I do not know what Hansard will make of it, but we are nearly there. If necessary, however, the Minister may write.

Jacqui Smith: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, especially its duration. I reassure him that, as I thought, individuals may make complaints to the NCSC, and the commission may investigate complaints about regulatory functions. Complaints may also be made by relatives. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is reassured that the commission, as well as the police and other enforcement bodies, will have a role.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 128 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 129 - General interpretation, etc.

Robert Walter: I beg to move amendment No. 271, in page 73, line 8, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
'(2) In determining for the purposes of this Act with what person, or where a child's home is or a child is placed— 
 (a) any absence of the child at a hospital or boarding school and any other temporary absence, and 
 (b) where the applicants for adoption are a married couple, any absence of one applicant at a hospital, or absence from home due to work or family commitments, or any other temporary absence 
 is to be disregarded.'.
 I live in hope that the amendment might, at least in principle, be accepted on the ground that it is eminently sensible, if somewhat technical. I was slightly concerned that it might be too technical because, when I looked for clause 129 in the explanatory notes, I found that it seems to be the only clause not referred to. 
 Clause 129 is about definitions. The amendment would insert a provision that the absence of a child at a hospital or boarding school, or any other temporary absence should be ''disregarded''. It occurs to me that the converse would be to disregard the absence of one of the parents if it was for a valid reason. To explain that, one must consider the relevant clauses. 
 Clause 41 is about children living with adopters before the application. Subsection (2) states that if a child is placed for adoption with a married couple, the child has to live with 
''one or both of them at all times during the period of ten weeks preceding the application.''
 A court would say that it provides for one or both of them, not that it must be both of them. Clause 41 then goes on to deal with the step-parent, who is obviously an individual; but when it comes to local authority foster parents, it states that 
''the child must have had his home with the applicants at all times during the period of one year preceding the application.''
 It does not say whether one of those applicants might legitimately be absent for that period. 
 Clause 47 is about applications for adoption. Subsection (3) states: 
''The second condition is that both spouses (in the case of an application under section 48) or the applicant (in the case of an application under section 49) have been habitually resident in a part of the British Islands for a period of not less than one year ending with the date of the application.''
 My point is that one spouse might legitimately have had reason not to be habitually resident during the whole period. One of them might have been on holiday and taken to hospital in another country, or been abroad on business. 
 The provisions on foster parents and clause 47(3) could be seen to provide a loophole. It is possible that someone could mischievously argue that, if the applicants are a married couple and one of them was not with the child for the whole of the qualifying period, it should somehow negate the process. That is why I suggest extending clause 129 to talk about not only disregarding the absence of the child, but the absence of one partner of a marriage, and that such an absence should not undermine the time commitment that is required in other clauses. Such an absence should be capable of being disregarded when determining the residence of the child for the qualifying period.

Jacqui Smith: Perhaps I should reassure hon. Members that the lack of explanatory notes on clause 129 was not the result of my officials or myself having forgotten it. We thought it unnecessary to include the clause in the explanatory notes because it was self-explanatory.
 Clause 129 is relatively straightforward. It is intended to provide a general interpretation of the terms used in the Bill. As the hon. Gentleman has pointed out, subsection (2) makes it clear that for the purposes of determining a child's home or where or with whom a child is placed, any temporary absence of the child, such as at a hospital or boarding school, is to be disregarded. 
 The amendment would add to clause 129 a paragraph providing that in the case of a married couple applying to adopt, the temporary absence of one of the two people should be disregarded. It is unnecessary to establish the presence of both adopters, or prospective adopters, in the home for the purpose of the Bill, so the amendment is not needed. In the case of an adoption application by a married couple under 
 clause 41, which, hon. Members will remember, provides for non-agency cases such as relative or some foster care adoptions, the child must have had his home with one or both of the adopters for specified periods preceding the application. To that extent, the temporary absence of one of the adopters is irrelevant. 
 The hon. Gentleman referred to clause 47(3), but only one of the conditions in clause 47 must be met. The first, in clause 47(2), is that one spouse should be domiciled here. The other condition requires the habitual residence of both spouses. If one were abroad, the other spouse would satisfy the first condition. Furthermore, when assessing the suitability of prospective adopters, the adoption agency considers the circumstances of the family as a whole. Factors such as the absence from home of one prospective adopter would, obviously, be considered along with the rest of the family's circumstances.

Robert Walter: The Minister has answered one of my points, and I answered another myself—the one about a child being placed for adoption in the normal way by an adoption agency. However, unless she was about to come to it, and I sensed that she was not, she failed to answer the point about clause 41(4). It states:
''If the applicants are local authority foster parents, the condition is that the child must have had his home with the applicants at all times during the period of one year preceding the application.''
 No exception is made with respect to one or other of the applicants. The reference is absolutely to ''the applicants''—the foster parents—and ''at all times''.

Jacqui Smith: The arguments that we used on a previous amendment, dealing with the 10-week limit for married couples, cover that point to some extent. While I understand that the hon. Gentleman is concerned that someone could try to throw a legal spanner in the works, I think that my point about assessment was the important one. However, I undertake to explain to the hon. Gentleman, perhaps in writing, why his amendment is not necessary, and to reassure him on the legal point about foster parents and the relevant period.

Robert Walter: I thank the Minister. Of course, if I am not reassured by what the Minister tells me later, we may be able to revisit the matter. In the light of what has been said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 130 to 132 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clause 133 - Commencement

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move amendment No. 263, in page 73, line 26, leave out 'and' and insert 'to'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 264 and 265 and Government new clause 17—Amendment of Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978: overseas adoptions.

Jacqui Smith: Clause 133 makes provision in relation to commencement. The Bill is to come into force on a day appointed by order of the Secretary of State, in consultation with the National Assembly for Wales. The only exception is chapter 2 of part 3—the clause is in that chapter—which covers final provisions and the provisions mentioned in subsections (3) and (4).
 The provisions listed in subsection (3) are to come into force on such a day as Scottish Ministers may by order appoint. They are clause 120, which provides Scottish restrictions on bringing children into the United Kingdom, clause 124(1) and the linked provisions in schedule 3. The provisions listed in clause 133(4) are to come into force on a day appointed by the appropriate Minister, which means the Secretary of State in England and the National Assembly in Wales. 
 Amendment No. 263 amends subsection (1), which provides that the Bill is to be commenced by the Secretary of State in consultation with the National Assembly for Wales, with the exception of the final provisions and the provisions mentioned in subsections (3) and (4). The effect of the amendment is to exclude from subsection (1) a new subsection that is added to the clause by amendment No. 265. That will ensure that paragraph 15 of schedule 4 is not commenced by the Secretary of State in consultation with the National Assembly for Wales. It will be commenced by Scottish Ministers, as will the provision in amendment No. 265. 
 It may have escaped the Committee's attention that the amendment is technical—there will be a short test later—and will ensure that the appropriate commencement powers are given to Scottish Ministers.

Julian Brazier: The Minister has unintentionally confused us completely. I have a question, but I am not sure whether I should ask it now or on the clause stand part debate. Perhaps I should make it on a point of order. I want to establish when the Government plan to put the Bill into effect in England, Wales and Scotland.

Marion Roe: Order. That is not a point of order, so the Minister can reply.

Jacqui Smith: I will try to respond to that after I have gone through the amendments and new clause 17, if hon. Members will let me.
 Amendment No. 264 amends clause 133(3). It provides for Scottish Ministers to commence new clause 17, under which they will have the power to make an order specifying the adoption orders to be recognised in Scotland, as the Secretary of State will with regard to England and Wales. The new clause also allows Scottish Ministers to make regulations that set the criteria that the procedures in an overseas country must meet in order to be included in the list of recognised overseas adoptions. 
 I will now give a fuller explanation of the new clause. Hon. Members will remember our debate on clause 83. That clause related to the new designated list, and the new clause mirrors it in relation to 
 Scotland. Adoption is a devolved matter, with separate systems operating north of the border. The new clause allows Scottish Ministers to work alongside those in England and Wales to put in place arrangements for the recognition in the UK of adoption orders made overseas. When Scottish Ministers make an order that specifies the adoption orders to be recognised in Scotland, they will also protect the status of those adopted in the past from countries included on the old designated list. 
 The current designated list was created in an order in 1973. To add China, it was amended in 1993 for England and Wales and in 1995 for Scotland. Other than that, it has remained unchanged. It was always the Government's stated intention to review the designated list for England and Wales once the 1993 Hague convention was ratified. However, it has become clear that that cannot happen without changes in primary legislation, largely because the removal of a country from the list could remove recognition of the adoption of someone previously adopted from it.

Robert Walter: The Minister referred to the provisions coming into effect once the Hague convention had been ratified. When is that likely?

Jacqui Smith: When I respond to the points raised by the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) about the Government's plans on the commencement of the provisions, I shall cover the point made by the hon. Member for North Dorset as well, if he will allow me.
 The new clause tackles the issues for Scotland in the same manner as clause 83 tackles them for England and Wales. Scottish Ministers share our intention to consult on the nature of the criteria included in regulations. It is likely that those criteria would be based on key principles enshrined in international law. Those include that the country ensures that the child has been freely given up for adoption and that adoption has not been induced by payment or compensation of any kind, that attempts are made to place the child with a family in its own country, that it has been confirmed that intercountry adoption is in the best interests of the child, that the arrangements and requirements for domestic and intercountry adoption are the same, that profit is not made from the process, and that the prospective adopters have been assessed and approved as suitable to adopt in their home country. 
 Scottish Ministers have agreed to work in concert with Ministers in England and Wales, so that adoption orders made overseas in future will only be recognised in the UK when the systems in that country meet agreed criteria. The new clause would allow that. 
 In the excitement of explaining the amendments, I may have failed to point out that amendment No. 265—I am surprised that no one missed it—inserted a new subsection into clause 133. It would provide the commencement by Scottish Ministers of paragraph 15 of schedule 4, which details transitional provisions and savings in respect of section 86(6) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, and clause 124(2) in so far as it 
 relates to paragraph 15. I am sure that the Committee is much relieved that I have spelt that out. 
 The hon. Member for Canterbury rightly asked when we would put into operation the important measures that we have debated. Clearly, we must await the conclusion of Parliament's deliberations on the measures in the Bill and Royal Assent. However, I can give the Committee some idea of our intentions for commencing the provisions. 
 Hon. Members will be only too aware that the Bill is complex and makes important and fundamental changes to the adoption system. We all want the measures in the Bill to succeed in providing a greater degree of permanence and stability in the lives of more of our most vulnerable children. Changing the law alone will not optimise the favourable impact of what we all agree is needed to achieve that; we must ensure that we properly prepare the way. Some changes will involve completely new areas of law and practice, such as the operation of placement and special guardianship orders. That will require awareness raising and training, not only for front-line staff in social services departments and voluntary adoption agencies but in the courts and among the judiciary, so that there is a smooth transition to the new legal framework. 
 We have said throughout that we shall consult at each stage to ensure that the detail is right. We shall draft and consult on regulations and court rules to give effect to the new provisions and set in place the new systems. Above all, we want to ensure that children do not experience delays in planning and delivering their permanent future because of uncertainty about the new legal arrangements. 
 We expect to bring into force the main provisions of the Bill in 2004, but I believe that there is a case for taking action on some measures sooner than that. Today I shall give the Committee an idea of which areas we shall take action on sooner. I propose to bring forward on Report any amendments that may be necessary to enable the provisions to come into force before 2004. 
 We intend to introduce provisions covering improved adoption support for new adoptive families from April 2003. As we know, that will be a key means of encouraging more families to adopt, to enable us to meet the public services agreement target to increase the number of adoptions by 40 to 50 per cent. by the end of 2004–05. We are already seeing improvements in those services on the ground, as we heard in our evidence-gathering sittings, and we want to maintain the momentum. We intend to consult on our proposals for a new framework for adoption support in the spring. On that basis, we shall develop regulations for further consultation to enable us to make final regulations, which we may have in place for April 2003. 
 A key element in our strategy to attract more adopters is to build the confidence of prospective adopters in the system of adopter assessment and approval. As the Committee knows, we made a commitment in the White Paper to conduct a fundamental review of adopter assessment this year. 
 We made a commitment to provide an independent review mechanism for prospective adopters who are dissatisfied when they learn that they may be turned down, which will also apply to decisions relating to access to information. I propose to introduce an amendment on Report to allow the independent review mechanism to operate in respect of adopter assessment in 2003. 
 In response to the question put by the hon. Member for North Dorset, I can inform the Committee that this summer we plan to complete the process of ratifying the Hague convention. There are strong arguments for introducing at the same time the new restrictions in clause 80 on bringing children into the United Kingdom. The Government ordered an urgent review of the law in January, following the Kilshaw case, and it would not be right to wait until 2004 to introduce those new measures. 
 As part of that package of measures, and alongside the ratification of the Hague convention, we plan to begin the process of reviewing the system for automatic recognition of overseas adoptions. We do not know how long that process will take or what complex issues will emerge. Nevertheless, I propose to table an amendment on Report that will allow us to set in place the new arrangements in 2003, should we be in a position to do so. 
 We believe that the new restrictions on electronic adoption advertising are important, and should not wait until 2004. Again, we shall introduce on Report an amendment to section 58of the Adoption Act 1976 to make it clear that the restriction applies both off-line and on-line. We intend to bring that into effect this year. 
 I hope that hon. Members agree that the approach that I outlined is in the best interests of children and will allow those responsible for the new systems time to adjust. I hope, too, that the Committee agrees that we have identified important priority areas for early action to ensure that key improvements are made and that new elements are put in place as soon as practicable.

Tim Loughton: I am sure that the Opposition will go along with the Minister as far as we can comprehend in the absence of a comprehensive flow chart, which in this case would need to be a chronological flow chart. The Minister successfully got her teeth around the technical amendments.
 We welcome the news that the Government urgently want to introduce the measures that gained cross-Committee support, especially with regard to adoption support services, which should come into force next year provided that the Bill sails through the rest of its parliamentary stages. The ratification of the Hague convention in the summer is another move that we welcome. In respect of intercountry adoption, I especially welcome the Minister's comments about clamping down on internet advertising, which is a menace that needs to be dealt with. There are many loopholes in that system, and new measures cannot come soon enough. 
 The Government amendments largely relate to the parts of the British isles outside England. What are the differences between Scotland and England in respect of adoption? Is there a fundamentally different approach between the Scottish Parliament and the United Kingdom Government? What soundings has she taken with her colleagues in Scotland? 
 New clause 17 includes the phrase 
''appear to the Scottish Ministers''.
 Does that mean that Scottish Ministers have a different view on overseas adoption and what constitutes overseas adoption in respect of the adoption law that will come into force in Scotland? I hope that England will not be included in their definition of overseas adoption, and that the fragmentation of the United Kingdom under this Government has not gone so far that England is regarded as overseas when it is only on the other side of Hadrian's wall. Will she set our minds to rest on that point? 
 Will the Minister also tell us when the Bill will come into force in Scotland? As it will have to go through extra processes in the Scottish Parliament, will it have a later start date there? Will the provisions that she said were likely to come into force at an earlier date in England come into force early in Scotland as well? Early in these proceedings, we made the point that, when the last Adoption Act came into force, it took a full seven years before all of its terms came into play. That was far too long, and that would be wholly unacceptable this time round. Given the constraints that are now on us to seek the approval of other legislative bodies in the United Kingdom, will the Minister assure us that all the work by her Department and by this Committee to promote the Bill will result in its coming into force as soon as possible in all parts of the United Kingdom and as extensively as in England and Wales?

Jacqui Smith: To the extent that adoption is a devolved matter for the Scottish Parliament, it is not appropriate for me to answer for Scottish Ministers. What I can tell the Committee is that Scotland is currently reviewing adoption law generally. We are working closely together on the designated list—which is what I referred to under new clause 17—because the new provision will allow Scottish Ministers and Ministers in England and Wales to work together to ensure that, in future, adoption orders made overseas will be recognised in the United Kingdom only when the systems in that country meet criteria set out in regulations and which I spelled out when I was outlining new clause 17.
 It is not possible for me to give the Committee assurances about something for which I am not responsible, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we have, in the process of developing this legislation, worked closely with Ministers in Scotland and with colleagues in the National Assembly for Wales. There is a clear view that we must avoid the scenario suggested by the hon. Gentleman in which we see people from each part of the kingdom as overseas 
 adopters or our processes became so out of step that it is difficult for individuals going through the adoption process to see the sense of the range of procedures across the United Kingdom. 
 Ironically, the need to ensure that the people on the receiving end are not confused by differences between the various procedures has resulted in the legislation being complex in order to ensure that the process is simple and joined up. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked about commencement for Scotland. That will be a matter for Scottish Ministers. I am sure that people there are raising the same points about the need to make progress in Scotland as have rightly arisen in discussion on this Bill. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 264, in page 73, line 30, leave out 'Section 120' and insert 
'Sections 120 and [Amendment of Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978: overseas adoptions],'.
 No. 265, in page 73, line 32, at end insert— 
'( ) Paragraph 15 of Schedule 4 and, so far as relating to that paragraph, section 124 (2) are to come into force on such day as the Scottish Ministers may by order appoint.'—[Jacqui Smith.]

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move amendment No. 266, in page 73, line 33, leave out '3(4)' and insert '3(3) and (4)'.
 We turn our attention from northwards to westwards, and Wales—[Interruption]. That is just to show my understanding of geography. Clause 133 makes provision for commencement, as we have discussed. The amendment adds clause 3(3). Hon. Members will remember that that refers to adoption support provisions, which are to come into force on a day appointed by the appropriate Minister. Clause 3(3)(a) enables regulations to be made extending the duty on local authorities to make and participate in arrangements to provide adoption support services to persons prescribed in regulations. Clause 3(3)(b) gives local authorities a power to extend their arrangements for the provision of adoption support services to any other person. That combination of a duty and a power provides the flexibility needed by local authorities in this area. The amendment would enable Ministers in England and Wales to commence the provisions in clause 3(3) separately, should they wish to do so. Ministers will also have the flexibility to prescribe different requirements in the regulations as to the persons to whom local authorities must make adoption support services available. That will ensure that the regulations are appropriately tailored to meet the needs of people living in England and Wales in relation to adoption support services. I hope that, in light of this explanation, hon. Members will feel able to accept the amendment. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 231, in page 73, line 33, after '51(1) to (3)', insert— 
'[Disclosing information during adoption process]'.
 No. 232, in page 73, line 33, after '62', insert— 
'[Disclosing protected information about adults] and [Disclosing protected information about children]'.—[Jacqui Smith.]
 Clause 133, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 134 - Extent

Jacqui Smith: I beg to move amendment No. 267, in page 74, line 3, at end insert—
'( ) So far as relating to provisions extending to Scotland, section 124 extends also to Scotland. 
 ( ) In Schedule 4, paragraph 15 extends only to Scotland'.
 Clause 134 defines the extent of the Bill. The majority of the Bill applies to England and Wales. In addition, the provisions listed at subsection (3) also extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. This is a technical amendment, which seeks to correct a small error in the final provisions of the Bill. The amendment amends clause 134 in so far as the provisions in schedules 3, 4 and 5 extend to Scotland and clause 124 introduces schedules 3, 4 and 5 of the Bill. The second new subsection provides for paragraph 15 of schedule 4 to extend to Scotland only. Paragraph 15 of schedule 4 enables the provisions for parental responsibility orders in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 to apply to a case in which a child has been freed for adoption or is the subject of an order made under section 55 of the Adoption Act 1976, where the application for the freeing order or the section 55 order is made before the 1976 Act is repealed. Section 55 of the 1976 Act provides for the transfer of parental responsibility prior to adoption abroad. I hope that, in light of this explanation, hon. Members will feel able to accept the amendment. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 134, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 135 - Short title

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: I gather that there have been occasions when the clause relating to the short title of a Bill has exercised the minds of members of a Committee for several hours. Given that the title of this Bill amounts to only four words, including the word ''Bill'', it would require greater parliamentary expertise than that available to me to spin out such a debate for longer than a few minutes. However, it occurred to me that during our proceedings in the past many weeks and on Second Reading before that, hon. Members have constantly been upbraided, not least by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Ms Munn), because this Bill is not the Children's Bill, which we were trying to amend in 1989. We have often made the mistake of referring to this legislation as the Adoption and Children's Bill when it is the Adoption and Children Bill, which will become the Adoption and Children Act. Given that there is a possibility that the title of this legislation could be shortened to the Children Act, there is potential for confusion with the
 Children Act 1989, which it is now too late to amend, in spite of the fact that many of us have slipped into misnaming it the Children's Act.
 Therefore, it may be helpful to the many people who will come after us and refer to the excellent legislation that we are about to wave on its way through the parliamentary process, and to the many people who will seek to amend it, which may seem strange because we, or at least the Government, think that the legislation is near perfect, were we to admit defeat to the mistakes that we have maken—[Hon. Members: ''Maken?'']—that we have been making and to amend the Bill's short title to the Adoption and Children's Bill. Then there would be no source of confusion. That would make its title very different from that of the 1989 Act, we would have put the Committee's imprimatur on the Bill and what was previously regarded as the wrong usage would become the correct usage. I hope that that is a helpful suggestion.

Robert Walter: I shall speak exceedingly briefly. I hope that the Minister will reassure us that the Government will table an amendment to the clause on Report because its short title is the Adoption and Children Act 2001, but time has moved on.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham made an interesting contribution. I notice that he has not had the courage of his convictions to table an amendment. I am unsure whether, when people look back on our proceedings, they will commend us most on our discussion about changing the Bill's title. On that basis, I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman.
 If the hon. Member for North Dorset is right, the change in date will be picked up automatically in the next print of the Bill. Presumably, the process is like the automatic ticking over of a—

Rosie Winterton: Clock?

Jacqui Smith: Thank you. That happens automatically as part of the parliamentary process, but I assure the hon. Member for North Dorset that if I am wrong and it is necessary to put the matter before Parliament, we will do so. In the meantime, I urge the Committee to agree that the title of the Bill should be the Adoption and Children Bill, and hope that we will soon be able to celebrate it becoming the Adoption and Children Act.

Julian Brazier: I hope that you will indulge me for a moment, Mrs. Roe, to make an observation on clause 135. There is currently much discussion about parliamentary reform, especially relating to what might happen in the other place. It is a curious anomaly, which struck me first when considering a different Bill, that each Bill that comes before a Committee of the House of Commons contains a clause that gives the Bill's short title. There is no corresponding clause that gives its long title. That means that, unlike in the other place, the long title may not be amended in the House of Commons.
 I am certain that every member of the Committee understands the profound difference that that makes, 
 because the long title governs what can be debated in Committee and in the House. With future debates in mind, which I would be ruled out of order for referring to at any greater length now, it is worth while highlighting in this relatively uncontentious and interesting Bill that there might be scope for some change in that area. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 135 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New clause 6 - Disclosing information during

'(1) Regulations under section 9 may require adoption agencies in prescribed circumstances to disclose in accordance with the regulations prescribed information to prospective adopters. 
 (2) In this section, ''prescribed'' means prescribed by regulations'.—[Jacqui Smith.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 7 - Disclosing protected information

'(1) This section applies where— 
 (a) a person applies to the appropriate adoption agency for protected information to be disclosed to him, and 
 (b) none of the information is about a person who is a child at the time of the application. 
 (2) The agency is not required to proceed with the application unless it considers it appropriate to do so. 
 (3) If the agency does proceed with the application it must take all reasonable steps to obtain the views of any person the information is about as to the disclosure of the information about him. 
 (4) The agency may then disclose the information if it considers it appropriate to do so. 
 (5) In deciding whether it is appropriate to proceed with the application or disclose the information, the agency must consider— 
 (a) the welfare of the adopted person, 
 (b) any views obtained under subsection (3), 
 (c) any prescribed matters, 
 and all the other circumstances of the case. 
 (6) This section does not apply to a request for information under section 58(2)'.—[Jacqui Smith.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 8 - Disclosing protected information

'(1) This section applies where— 
 (a) a person applies to the appropriate adoption agency for protected information to be disclosed to him, and 
 (b) any of the information is about a person who is a child at the time of the application. 
 (2) The agency is not required to proceed with the application unless it considers it appropriate to do so. 
 (3) If the agency does proceed with the application, then, so far as the information is about any person who is at the time a child, the agency must take all reasonable steps to obtain— 
 (a) the views of any parent or guardian of the child, and 
 (b) the views of the child, if the agency considers it appropriate to do so having regard to his age and understanding and to all the other circumstances of the case, 
 as to the disclosure of the information. 
 (4) And, so far as the information is about any person who has at the time attained the age of 18 years, the agency must take all reasonable steps to obtain his views as to the disclosure of the information. 
 (5) The agency may then disclose the information if it considers it appropriate to do so. 
 (6) In deciding whether it is appropriate to proceed with the application, or disclose the information, where any of the information is about a person who is at the time a child— 
 (a) if the child is an adopted child, the child's welfare must be the paramount consideration, 
 (b) in the case of any other child, the agency must have particular regard to the child's welfare. 
 (7) And, in deciding whether it is appropriate to proceed with any application or disclose any information, the agency must consider— 
 (a) the welfare of the adopted person (where subsection (6)(a) does not apply), 
 (b) any views obtained under subsection (3) or (4), 
 (c) any prescribed matters, 
 and all the other circumstances of the case. 
 (8) This section does not apply to a request for information under section 58(2)'.—[Jacqui Smith.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 17 - Amendment of Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978:

'In section 65 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 (interpretation), for subsection (2) there is substituted— 
 ''(2) In this Act, ''overseas adoption'' means an adoption of a description specified by an order made by the Scottish Ministers. 
 (2A) The description specified by an order under subsection (2) shall be a description of adoptions of children which— 
 (a) appear to the Scottish Ministers to be effected under the law of any country or territory outside the British Islands; 
 (b) are not Convention adoptions; and 
 (c) meet any requirements prescribed by regulations made by the Scottish Ministers. 
 (2B) In subsection (2A), ''children'' includes persons who were children at the time the adoption was applied for. 
 (2C) An order under subsection (2) may contain provision as to the manner in which evidence of any overseas adoption may be given. 
 (2D) Any reference in this Act to an overseas adoption includes a reference to an adoption— 
 (a) of such description as is specified in an order made, or having effect as if made, under subsection (2) before the coming into force of section [Amendment of Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978: overseas adoptions] of the Adoption and Children Act 2002; and 
 (b) effected before the coming into force of that section.''.'—[Jacqui Smith.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 1 - Interviews with children

' In the case of an application for a placement order, for the variation or revocation of such an order, or for an adoption order, 
no interview which is conducted with a child shall be relied upon in proceedings unless supported by a video or audio recording of that interview.'.—[Tim Loughton.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Tim Loughton: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 I am pleased that we have a little time left in which to discuss the Opposition new clauses. New clause 1 is a probing new clause, tabled by my hon. Friend the ubiquitous hon. Member for Isle of Wight. The new clause seems to be sensible. It would allow evidence from children to be relied on only if it were supported by a video or audio recording of their interviews. He tells me that there is concern that children's statements may be used to influence the court, even if the way in which they were obtained would be out of order for the purposes of a criminal prosecution, and he can cite some examples of that from cases in his constituency. Having made inquires at the House of Commons Library, he also told me that it is unlawful to disclose any reports or other evidence to any third parties without the leave of the court, even after proceedings are concluded. He is concerned that that is perhaps unreasonable because, on that basis, parents who have a grievance cannot even disclose the relevant information to local councillors who are responsible for social services departments or to a Member of Parliament.

Meg Munn: Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that any person who wants such information to be disclosed can apply to the court, giving their reasons, and the court will give due consideration to those reasons? The papers are the property of the court in order to preserve the confidentiality that we would expect in those circumstances.

Tim Loughton: Yes, I appreciate that. That came up in discussion of the earlier amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight, to which the Minister responded. There seems to be an anomaly whereby a parent with a strong direct interest cannot disclose information on a confidential basis, even to a Member of Parliament or a councillor who is responsible for the social services department, who may be privy to the information that is being discussed or decided on in court.
 I said that this was a probing amendment. We have, of course, referred at length to the desirability of ascertaining the child's wishes as a party to any of the adoption processes. We have had debates on whether a child's age should be taken into account when their evidence is considered. The Bill contains all sorts of provisions about ascertaining the child's point of view, but there is no compulsion for somebody to go and speak, first-hand, to the child. That is still a weakness, even though one would hope that, in practice, the child would be consulted without such a compulsion. 
 I cited my own case of parental custody divorce proceedings many years ago, in which a greater input into what was being discussed and written about the circumstances of the child would have been desirable. Given the varying reliability of the child's evidence, which may depend on age, circumstances or the 
 different emotional pressures on that child, there seems to be a case for ensuring that everything happens as dispassionately and objectively as possible, to minimise the pressure on that child. Keeping a video or audio recording seems a sensible way to do that. 
 That is the purpose of the new clause. I hope that the Minister can give some assurances as to why it will not be necessary, so that I can convey her message to my eager hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight.

Meg Munn: On reading the new clause, I was frankly appalled. I know that the Committee is aware of the extent of Labour Members' experience of such situations. The idea that we should interview children on video about their wishes and feelings about an adoption is so bad that words fail me. I cannot believe that anybody would think that that is the right way forward.
 Video interviewing of children was introduced in criminal proceedings to ensure that children who had been abused did not have to repeat their allegations in court, as they had had to in the past, often before their alleged abuser. It was designed to protect the child. However, anybody who has ever been involved in a video interview with a child, however it is done, and whatever steps are taken to minimise the distress to the child, will know one would never want one's own child to have go through it, because it is not easy. 
 Adoption involves civil proceedings, and we are concerned with the importance of knowing the wishes and feelings of children. Hon. Members who have children will understand that children say different things at different times to different people, and that their age and understanding of the issues will have implications for what they say about their wishes and feelings. My hon. Friends who have worked in the social work field will have heard children saying different things at different times, depending on which of their parents they are with or whether they are with their foster parents or their birth parents. It is not easy to get to the bottom of what a child really thinks. In the adoption process and in care proceedings, which often precede adoption, necessary mechanisms are already in place to ensure that the wishes and feelings of the child are taken into account.

Tim Loughton: I appreciate the hon. Lady's experience of the matter, and her remarks. I remind her that the new clause refers to video or audio. While video may be an encumbrance or an intrusion and as such make such an interview more difficult, I should have thought that taking an audio recording would not pose that sort of problem. The reasons that the hon. Lady has just stated—that children will say different things to different people in different circumstances—surely make it essential that there should be a proper record, which can be referred back to, of multiple interviews. If what children say varies, would such a record not be better than relying on the impression of the person who conducts the interviews, which may differ from one interview to the next and cannot necessarily be substantiated?

Meg Munn: I was about to say that the CAFCASS officer is there to consider the child's needs. Officers see the child in different circumstances and base their conclusions on observation of the child in a number of situations. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that, in addition to everything else that the CAFCASS officer has to take into account, such as ensuring that they develop a relationship with a child and that they interview them in appropriate circumstances, they should also become an expert on audio equipment? Is he suggesting that they should carry that equipment around with them, so that at some point someone is able to play back everything that the child has said and make a judgment on the conclusion reached by the CAFCASS officer? The courts generally have a great deal confidence in the CAFCASS officer and usually respect the fact that they have reflected on what the child has said and the circumstances in which they said it.
 It is beyond belief that anyone could think that the new clause provides an answer. The issue is enormously important, and it is difficult to get it right. However, experienced court officers are expected to set out in their reports the tensions and difficulties—especially in the case the older children whom we have been discussing—of what the child is trying to express, as well as how they have reached their view and the circumstances in which they have spoken to the child. 
 The hon. Member for Isle of Wight may be ubiquitous, and seems fairly ambitious. He may be proposing the measure with certain situations in mind, but people should reconsider it, because it is not sensible.

Jacqui Smith: Following the excellent contribution made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley, it is hardly worth my while standing up.
 The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham spoke about records not being able to be disclosed without leave of the court. That is true; it and is designed to protect the privacy of the child and the other parties. The parties can, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley pointed out, apply to the court for permission to disclose and that is important, because information disclosed in court may affect other people who also have the right to have their privacy respected. 
 On the substantive point of the new clause, it is worth noting that audio and video recording are not routinely used or thought necessary by CAFCASS, local authorities or adoption agencies. The Government have not had representations about that from children's organisations or other stakeholders. The court may already consider applications by parties to the case for specific evidence, including video or audio evidence, to be lodged in the proceedings. The child's views may be taken into account in several ways in adoption and placement proceedings, including the presence of CAFCASS officers and solicitors to represent children's best interests. 
 If there is concern about the extent to which the evidence represents the views of the child, the court process provides the opportunity for statements to be challenged. All children are interviewed sensitively, 
 taking into account the circumstances of the individual case and the age and understanding of the child. I agree that we need to ask why children should be subjected to the additional pressure of having their views recorded, when, incidentally, that would not be required of adults. The clause would not apply equally to all children. It could not do so, practically, because some children might be too young to be interviewed. 
 While the use of recorded evidence is common in criminal proceedings—and my hon. Friend pointed out the reasons for that—there is no such requirement about giving evidence in family proceedings. Children of sufficient age and understanding can be made a party to the proceedings and speak directly to the court. 
 If the hon. Member for Isle of Wight is mainly concerned about how to represent the voice of the child in the proceedings, my response is that we have gone into that issue at length in Committee. Hon. Members may fear that he is making a misguided attempt to force on to children the recording of their views, and I hope that on his behalf the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham will feel able to withdraw the new clause.

Tim Loughton: My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight will, I am sure, be disappointed, if not wounded, particularly by the comments of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, and the Minister's remarks about his being misguided. I remind the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley that the new clause was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight and that she should not attempt to shoot the messenger. If my hon. Friend is not sufficiently wounded by the power of Labour Members' comments, he may seek to table a version of the new clause on Report, at which point the hon. Lady can target her ire on him directly. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 4 - Extension of the Convention to

'(1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for giving effect to the Convention in Northern Ireland. 
 (2) An Order in Council under subsection (1) in respect of Northern Ireland may, in particular, make any provision corresponding to provision which in relation to any part of Great Britain is made by the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 or may be made by regulations under section 1 of that Act.'.—[Mr. Walter.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Robert Walter: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 This new clause may be technical, but it is important. It relates to our earlier deliberations about intercountry adoptions and our references to the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999, which the House rightly passed to implement the Hague convention. I was delighted when the Minister told us that the United Kingdom plans to ratify the Hague convention in the summer. With that in mind, and as a matter of public policy, I feel that I should draw the 
 Committee's attention to the final clause of the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999. Clause 18(4) states: 
''Subject to subsection (5), this Act extends to Great Britain only.''
 Earlier in our deliberations, we agreed to provisions enabling the Government to extend, by Order in Council, the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 to any of the British overseas territories. We shall, eventually, have implemented the Hague convention in Great Britain and the British overseas territories but not in Northern Ireland. 
 The Government might pray in support of their position the fact that the summary of the explanatory notes to the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 states: 
''Northern Ireland intends to introduce legislation at a later date to give effect to the Convention''.
 It is my understanding that Northern Ireland has not yet done that. I know that the Northern Ireland Assembly, when it has been in session, has had other things on its mind. I congratulated the Minister on the decision that the United Kingdom would ratify the convention, but I hesitate over that now, because I do not believe that it would be possible for us to ratify it if one part of the United Kingdom had not implemented the legislation to put the convention into effect. 
 The matter is particularly important because Northern Ireland is the only part of the United Kingdom that has a land frontier with a foreign country. That probably makes it the part of the United Kingdom most vulnerable to abuse of the Hague convention. That is not to suggest that the Republic of Ireland is not also a signatory to the Hague convention, although I understand that it has not yet ratified it. None the less, it is a point of vulnerability. 
 I hope that the Committee will react favourably when I say that the act does not cover the United Kingdom—England and Wales and Scotland have passed the necessary legislation but Northern Ireland has not—the Act should be extended by Order in Council not only to British overseas territories but to Northern Ireland.

Jacqui Smith: The hon. Gentleman has explained what he hopes to achieve through the new clause and I have no disagreement with the objective. However, I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that the new clause is not necessary. It would enable an Order in Council to be made to give effect to the Hague convention in Northern Ireland. However, that is not necessary, because the Northern Ireland Assembly passed legislation in 2001 enabling it to make provision for Hague convention adoptions. The Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act (Northern Ireland) 2001 received Royal Assent in July 2001 and the Assembly can now make the necessary regulations, which will, in turn, enable the United Kingdom to ratify the convention later this year.
 I think that when the hon. Gentleman referred to explanatory notes he was alluding to those for the 1999 Act, because, of course, when they were published Northern Ireland had not introduced its Bill. The Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 
 provides a statutory basis for the regulation of intercountry adoption so that children living abroad are afforded maximum protection in adoption processes. The 1999 Act and the Adoption (Intercountry Aspect) (Northern Ireland) Act 2001 enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Hague convention on protection of children and co-operation in respect of intercountry adoption, and introduce sanctions against those who bring children into the UK without following proper procedures. With that assurance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw the new clause.

Robert Walter: I thank the Minister for correcting me. Obviously, I had been acting on information that was out of date, and I am reassured that Northern Ireland has passed the necessary legislation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 13 - Provision of information relating to adoption

'Organisations providing services with regard to pregnancy and the care of young children must be under a duty to provide information relating to adoption.'.—[Mr. Brazier.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Julian Brazier: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 It would be nice to be able to say something about each of new clauses. Thus, as we have only a short time left, I will be brief. The purpose of the new clause, which has been loosely drafted, is to probe and draw attention to an important point. Time prevents me from giving a lot of verbatim quotes, but the Government's statements and academic testimony from institutions such as Cardiff university make it clear that there is a shortage of information in many quarters about adoption and its benefits. 
 I hope that the Committee will forgive me for briefly mentioning a tragic constituency case that I referred to some time ago, in which a 13-year-old girl, whose mother was a financially struggling lone parent, unexpectedly gave birth to a baby. For obvious reasons, the girl had given no indication to her mother that she was pregnant. The family thought that she was putting on weight. 
 Some aspects of that case relate to the new clause. A social worker visited the thunder-struck, devastated family, intending to do her best under the circumstances. She did not suggest that adoption was a possibility. The 13-year-old child was left with the impression that she had only two options. One was that the baby should be taken into care and fostered; the girl was given an unattractive picture of fostering. The second option was that the girl's mother should look after the baby while she was at school. Their decision might have been different if adoption had been suggested. 
 I do not want to criticise a particular social worker. However, I was pleased to receive a letter of apology from the director of social services in Kent. I understand that fresh guidance has been distributed 
 that makes it clear that adoption should be mentioned prominently in such cases.

Hilton Dawson: Does the hon. Gentleman propose to extend the duty to general practitioners?

Julian Brazier: The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point, which the Government should consider.
 As I said, no mention was made of adoption at the early stage at which decisions quickly become set in stone. Another point arises from that tragic, difficult case. Let us move from the actual case to a hypothetical variant of it, which is a more common occurrence, and suppose that the girl had told her mother some months earlier that she was pregnant. Whether it be a social worker or, as the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre rightly said, a general practitioner, one hopes that whoever they consulted would mention adoption prominently as a possible option. 
 A better local story is that East Kent Community NHS Trust, which is responsible for mental health care in my constituency, said in a presentation to Members of Parliament a few months ago that it commonly discusses options in the tragic cases of which, sadly, we have a disproportionate number in my area because of the moving—I hesitate to use the word dumping—of a number of mental health cases from central London to east Kent. In several cases, women with severe mental illnesses have become pregnant. In some cases the local authority has been very good in considering before birth what will happen to the child and, insofar as is possible, discussing the matter with the mother. It is stressed that adoption is an option and it is discussed with the mother early before the birth. 
 I do not want to detain the Committee any longer. It is not necessary for the Minister to tell me that the clause is appallingly widely drafted. She understands that it is a probing new clause. I would be grateful for her comments on what can be done to improve the information given so that young girls do not feel that their only options are to allow the child to be taken into care, to have an abortion, or to struggle as a 13 or 14-year-old with a grandparent trying to bring up the child.

Jacqui Smith: I shall say only briefly that the new clause is extremely broadly drafted, to the extent that were we to go ahead with it we could be in a position, for example, where the providers of day care nurseries should display information to working mothers who leave their child in the crèche about adoption being another option. I do not believe that is what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting, nor that expectant mothers arriving at a maternity clinic should see information encouraging them to consider adoption even though they have expressed no such wish and are looking forward to the birth of their child.
 I accept that the hon. Gentleman said that that is not his intention. I hope that I can reassure him about the extent of advice that is necessary. If an expectant mother raises the issue of adoption or expresses doubts about motherhood, she should receive advice from her 
 GP—this relates to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre—midwife, or pregnancy adviser. Professionals are provided with information by their Royal Colleges and others on sources of advice and counselling on an expectant mother's options: to keep the baby, adoption, abortion, and future contraceptive needs. Where a woman is considering abortion, successive Governments have always recognised the importance of objective counselling. 
 All UK health authorities and private sector clinics carrying out abortions have guidance on the provision of counselling services, which makes it clear that counselling should include the provision of advice and information about all possible alternatives to termination, including adoption.

Julian Brazier: There is a difficulty if the Government provide mere advice without an element of compulsion. A high proportion of abortions in this country are carried out in private clinics, so there is a financial interest in the abortion taking place. Surely, in that regard at least, there is a case for some statutory move rather than just guidance?

Jacqui Smith: The new clause proposes pretty strong guidance. It is clear both to health authorities and to private sector clinics that carry out abortions that counselling should include the provision of advice and information about all the possible alternatives to termination, including adoption. Adoption should be raised as an option when pregnant teenagers under 18 seek advice from their GP or pregnancy advisers. Professionals should once again provide all the information on sources of advice and counselling. Each top-tier local authority area has a teenage pregnancy co-ordinator, and they are required to ensure that a directory or service guide is provided for pregnant teenagers under 18. This guide must list sources of advice on future options, such as keeping the baby, adoption or abortion. Family doctors, the sexual health service and pregnancy advisers are provided with an advice checklist, which also includes the option of adoption.
 In the light of those comments, and given the sensitivities on this issue, I hope that I can assure hon. Members that there will clarity in the information that must be provided to expectant mothers and others, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw his new clause.

Julian Brazier: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 14 - Foster carers and adopters: insurance

'Foster carers and adopters shall be required to be covered by insurance for legal proceedings that might result from any complaints of negligence or failure to provide sufficient information on the part of adoption agencies.'.—[Mr. Bellingham.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 The Minister will be aware of the power given to insurance companies in this country, as we saw for example in Clwyd, which have discouraged local authorities from admitting any form of liability for fear of compensation claims. It is quite understandable that apologies and self-criticism are unlikely, and very often users of the system will feel somewhat failed by it. 
 I will not go into a great deal of detail, but one can certainly envisage a situation in which legal action might be taken against the adopting parents by the birth parents or blood relations of an adopted child. In a current case, I understand from correspondence sent to me, a couple in Flintshire who adopted a child abroad are being taken to court by Flintshire county council over declaration of the adoption. The couple will obviously have to pay a substantial sum of money. A way of avoiding and averting that problem would be to require foster carers and adopters to have the necessary insurance cover for any legal proceedings that might result. 
 I hope that the Minister will agree that the new clause is logical, straightforward and sensible. It puts in place a safety net, in the form of insurance, and I hope very much that the Minister will accept it.

Jacqui Smith: I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but I do not think that we will be able to accept the new clause. The hon. Gentleman made it explicit that it would require foster carers and adopters to be covered by insurance for legal proceedings that might result from any complaints of negligence or failure to provide sufficient information on the part of adoption agencies. However, it is not clear whether the clause is intended to allow foster carers or adopters, as well as the adoption agency, to initiate and possibly defend proceedings against others. Is it his intention to cover the cost of legal proceedings for the adopters who take legal action against the foster carers or even the birth parents of their adopted child where they complain of abuse of that child? Is it also intended that the insurance will cover the cost of legal proceedings in defence of the same foster carers? Is it intended to cover civil or criminal costs? It is not clear from the clause whether the adoption agency should provide the insurance cover.

Henry Bellingham: The new clause is certainly intended to cover resulting costs where there might be an order from the court. It is simply intended to cover the expenses of the legal action. I would have thought that was made clear.

Jacqui Smith: I am not sure that it does make that completely clear. Nor does it make clear whether the adoption agency should provide the insurance cover or whether it is something that the foster carers or adopters should have to arrange themselves. The concern may be about those cases in which foster carers or adopters have not been given sufficient information by relevant agencies, and have therefore not been able to meet the child's needs, or the adoptive or foster family have suffered harm.
 As the Committee knows, we tabled new clause 6, which through clause 9 provides the power to ensure through regulations that adoption agencies provide all 
 the key information that prospective adopters need, and we will consult the stakeholders on that. Under the Children Act 1989 regulations, local authority or voluntary adoption agencies that place the children are already required to assess the needs of a looked-after child and ensure that they are met in a way that promotes the child's welfare. Under the regulations, the relevant local authority or voluntary adoption agency should ensure that foster parents have all the information that is necessary to enable them to care for a child who is placed with them. Furthermore, under the Fostering Services Regulations 2001, the responsible authority must continue to be satisfied that the child's welfare continues to be supported by the placement. The national minimum standards provide that under standard 9, matches between children and carers are secured by information sharing between all parties. 
 To that extent, provision is made to ensure that the situations described by the hon. Gentleman do not occur. If a court decides that an agency has failed in its duty of care towards prospective adopters or foster carers, and that the family has suffered harm as a result, it may award compensation to the claimants and the agency may also be obliged to meet all the legal costs. If the new clause's intention is for the adoption agency to provide the insurance cover for legal proceedings, the insurer would be obliged to cover the legal costs on any complaint of negligence, even for vexatious legal claims. That would inevitably lead to high insurance premiums for agencies, drawing away the resources that they need to provide their services. It would place a burden on voluntary adoption agencies, too. Given that that is not what the hon. Gentleman probably wants to achieve, I hope that he will withdraw the new clause.

Henry Bellingham: The Minister has been fluent, and we know that she is competent and able. I will take her word on the matter, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 15 - Powers of the Secretary of State

'Any persons involved in the adoption or fostering process has the right to be informed of the power of the Secretary of State regarding lack of compliance on the part of local authorities and voluntary agencies.'.—[Mr. Bellingham.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 I will be quick because I gather that we want to wind things up by ten minutes to five o'clock. That gives me about two minutes. 
 I remind the Committee of a key provision of the Bill, which was in clause 14 and concerned the default power of the appropriate Minister. How will the Minister discover any lack of compliance on the part of local authorities? He will have performance reports from the social services inspectorate, but how will he discover lesser degrees of failure in duty or individual cases? I am sure that the Minister will agree that local authorities are unlikely to point out problems or examples of poor performance, so there is a strong 
 argument for inserting the new clause. It makes it clear that anyone involved in the process has the right to be informed of the Secretary of State's powers. It would be a simple and straightforward addition. My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham and I have put a lot of effort into drafting it, and we feel strongly that the Committee should accept it.

Jacqui Smith: I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that his new clause is not necessary. The objective appears to be to ensure high standards in voluntary adoption agencies and local authorities. From April 2003, voluntary adoption agencies will be inspected and registered by the National Care Standards Commission and by the National Assembly in Wales under part 2 of the Care Standards Act 2000. Local authority adoption services will also be inspected by the NCSC from April 2003. The hon. Gentleman was right; they are currently inspected by the social services inspectorate.
 Adoption is a mainstream social services function, and people have recourse to the complaints procedure, as amended under clause 111. Clause 14 provides default powers for the appropriate Minister if a local authority fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with its duties. We have a comprehensive performance assessment system for social services. 
 The Care Standards Act 2000 also set up an independent children's rights director, who will have a national overview of the rights of children receiving services regulated by that commission. In the event of a serious failure by a local authority to comply with its duties, the Secretary of State may consider whether to use the default powers. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman considers the proposals put forward by the new clause to be unnecessary, and that we can all share the view that provisions are in place to ensure high standards.

Henry Bellingham: I am glad that we have had the assurance that the new clause is otiose. The Minister was impressive: I shall write a letter to her Chief Whip to tell him that she has done well on the Committee, although she has not accepted enough of our amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the Chairman do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

Tim Loughton: On a point of order, Mrs. Roe. I would like to interrupt the love-in. We are approaching the end of the Bill, and I would like to initiate the credits, which are traditional at this stage.
 On behalf of the Committee, I thank you, and your co-Chairmen, Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Hood, for their good services in guiding through a technical Bill without anyone falling asleep during the proceedings. I pay tribute to the Clerk, Tom Goldsmith, who went beyond the call of duty helping Committee members to table amendments: that was not easy at times, given the technicalities of the Bill. I thank the Hansard reporters for their understanding during the more 
 technical debates. I thank all the outside bodies and adoption agencies, which contributed to our deliberations with their technical expertise at the earlier witness sessions, in the dim and distant past when we first embarked on this enterprise. That underlines the usefulness of that exercise. 
 I speak for the Opposition and the spokesman for Plaid Cymru, the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd), who unfortunately cannot be here today but supported many of our amendments, in saying that our deliberations have been good humoured. We had two apologies from the Minister during this afternoon's sitting alone. This morning, true to form, the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre did not disappoint us. In mirroring his Second Reading contribution, he offered excellent contributions throughout the proceedings, though he slightly ruined it by blaming all the ills in the history of mankind on the Conservative party. 
 The Committee was entertained by the radiance and expertise of the Parliamentary Secretary, and the expertise and ubiquitous flowcharts of the Minister. All Committee members have shown a great amount of expertise and practical experience. Government Members fell over themselves to outbid each other on how many years experience they had as social workers. In the case of the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Mr. Shaw), that is measured not in blood, sweat and tears, but in the extent of his receding hairline through the years. 
 I am proud to say that we on the Conservative Benches have precisely zero hours of practical experience with social workers, which has done our speeches no harm. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, whose name we now know how to pronounce, who made some good contributions on his Committee debut. 
 The Committee was a classic example of where programming was unnecessary, because the Bill had cross-party support. In the programming that we have suffered, 43 clauses have been untouched, and 7 touched only partly. More than a third of the Bill, as well as two schedules, has not been debated in Committee. Nevertheless, we wave on its way a better Bill. The Minister has been amenable to many of our suggestions and she made a major U-turn on access to information, which we greatly welcome. The highlight of the Committee was probably the success of my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset in amending clause 87 from ''British colonies'' to ''British overseas territories''. It may be too late for Gibraltar, if the Government sell it down the river, but that is a debate for another day. 
 We have covered many issues extensively. We have debated the sperm of members of the House of Lords; we have done a Cook's tour of other countries' adoption procedures; we have heard revelations about adopted people not knowing that they were adopted until their 70s or 80s; this morning we have heard the extraordinary paradox of accusations of right-wing political correctness; and we all now know how to pronounce the constituency of the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy, even if we do not know where it is. Unfortunately, he appears to 
 have welshed on the bottle of wine deal that he promised earlier. 
 We wave on a better Bill, and we welcome the two days on he Report to which we shall all contribute some time in the future.

Jacqui Smith: I share many of the hon. Gentleman's sentiments, particularly regarding the good-natured way in which the Committee has carried out its deliberations. I thank you, Mrs. Roe, and Mr. Stevenson, and also Mr. Hood for his cameo appearance. I should also like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe) for chairing the Special Standing Committee sittings.
 I want to put on record my thanks to the Clerks and Hansard reporters for their hard work in supporting the Committee. I also thank my radiant ministerial colleague, the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department as well as my equally radiant hon. Friends the Members for Poplar and Canning Town (Jim Fitzpatrick) and for Basildon (Angela Smith) for their sterling work on the Bill. Of course, I want to thank all members of the Committee for the considerable experience that they brought to the Committee. It is not always easy for a Minister when so many members of a Committee have so much experience. In this case, hon. Members put their experience to extremely good use and the legislation will be the better for their representations both during Committee sittings and behind the scenes. 
 I thank Opposition Members, not only the Front Benches, who have hardly ever been churlish and mischievous, and I particularly thank the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) for the great good sense that he displayed in his last two contributions this evening. It may not be the done thing to thank officials, but I want to mention the support that they have provided. 
 The Committee may like to know that James Paton, who appeared before the Special Standing Committee, has been in hospital since Christmas, but is now out and recovering. I am sure that all members of the Committee would want to pass on their best wishes.

Rosie Winterton: And my officials.

Jacqui Smith: Ably prompted by my hon. Friend, I also want to put on record the support of officials across government, particularly from the Lord Chancellor's Department. As the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham pointed out, the Special
 Standing Committee gave us the opportunity to consider the Bill in greater detail and to receive information from stakeholders more effectively than would have been possible without it. The hon. Gentleman is right to thank the stakeholders and lobby groups for their commitment.
 Finally, we can be proud that we are sending on its way a Bill that will put the welfare of children at the heart of the adoption system, cut out delays, place a clearer duty on local authorities to provide adoption support services, give adopters a better deal, provide new rights to be reviewed after assessment, introduce special guardianship orders that will legally underpin the adoption register, and address the concerns expressed by members of the Committee. 
 We said at the outset that we were engaging in a ''once in a generation'' opportunity to modernise adoption legislation and I want to thank all those who have been involved in ensuring that the Committee stage has been particularly constructive and has made the legislation as good as possible.

Sandra Gidley: Without hesitation, deviation or too much repetition, I associate myself with the comments made by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham. I recently read Giles Brandreth's diaries, in which he said that he went to the Whips and told them that he was an expert on culture, media and sport—so they promptly assigned him to the Transport Bill. I am delighted that no party has taken that approach on this Bill.
 I have found very useful the experience of Government Members, which has brought us down to earth on several occasions. I have also very much enjoyed the anecdotal contributions from the hon. Member for Canterbury. Indeed, I am sorry that they have not been mentioned so far, as they brought a human touch to the proceedings.

Marion Roe: On behalf of Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Hood and myself, I thank hon. Members for their kind comments. It is always a pleasure to chair a Committee that can debate important issues with good humour.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Bill, as amended, to be reported. 
 Committee rose at two minutes past Five o'clock.